What might “Civilian Oversight” of the Chicago Police Department look like?

Criminal Justice ,

Published: January 19, 2021

The Chicago Police Department has been the subject of various concerns for decades; in 2016, a Police Accountability Task Force report exposed major flaws in the policing system, such as racist and biased tactics, gaps in accountability, rampant misconduct, poor community relations, and ineffective de-escalation tactics. The goal of the report was to examine the “larger systemic policies, practices and procedures that spawn, support and protect the kind of corrosive behavior played out every day by the police on the streets.” The Task Force provided a series of recommendations to address these issues and the report served as the basis of the City Council of Chicago agreeing to a three part oversight structure later that year. The three part plan consisted of improvements to the Civilian Office of Police Accountability (COPA), the inauguration of the Deputy Inspector General for Public Safety position, and the “creation of a Civilian Oversight Commission to assist in overseeing the operations of the CPD, COPA and related agencies.”

The Chicago City Council is currently considering two proposals for civilian-led oversight commissions for the Chicago Police Department (CPD) and its related offices and governing bodies.

The two current proposals to City Council for a civilian-led police commission are the Civilian Police Accountability Council (“CPAC”) and the Community Commission of the Grassroots Alliance for Police Accountability (“GAPA”). The two plans aim to provide varying levels of oversight and reform. CPAC consists of a large overhaul of accountability systems, shifting many responsibilities to its eleven elected members that each represent two contiguous districts. GAPA takes a relatively more moderate approach, keeping most powers of offices and agencies the same while its various district councils serve an advisory role in various processes. 

Chicago Appleseed examined aspects where these proposals differ – commissioner selection, mayoral power, discipline of officers, and CPD administration and policymaking – in the context of Chicago’s policing history in an attempt to determine which may better serve as a vehicle for accountability. We also addressed legal concerns related to CPAC that have been raised in the public sphere, such as at Public Safety Committee meetings of the City Council. We looked at each proposal in terms of potential effectiveness and ability to reach overarching goals, such as building communal bonds, reducing bias, and making lasting improvements to police accountability systems.

No matter what proposal is ultimately chosen by the City Council – CPAC, GAPA, or something else entirely – it is clear to Chicago Appleseed that the city must enact a process for true civilian oversight of the Chicago Police and that it should be implemented immediately. 

Selection and Powers of Commission Members

One way that CPAC and GAPA differ is in how their police oversight commissions are elected.

  • CPAC’s commissioners are elected in a direct, “nonpartisan election” every four years, held in “each set of two contiguous police districts in the City of Chicago.”
  • GAPA’s system to select commissioners is a more indirect, somewhat complicated process. First, Chicago residents from “each of the City’s police districts” vote for “a District Council made up of three members.” Then, these District Council members “select, by majority vote, one of their [three] members to serve on the Commission [Nominating] Committee.” The Committee receives nominations for GAPA’s commission from “any resident of the city of Chicago,” reviews “all applications received,” and then “select[s] as finalists no fewer than 4 qualified candidates for each existing or anticipated vacancy on the Commission.” The Commission Nominating Committee then votes on those four candidates to ultimately “nominate two candidates to fill [a] vacancy” for selection by the Mayor. If the Mayor selects a candidate from the list, that candidate is confirmed by a vote in the City Council; if the Mayor rejects both candidates proposed, the Commission Nominating Committee must submit new lists of candidates until one is approved.

If the City Council’s goal is to create a police oversight commission that gives Chicago residents real power in overseeing the police, there is no doubt CPAC’s selection process accomplishes that goal better than GAPA’s selection process. A direct election simply gives more power to the people than an indirect one, as it allows the residents of Chicago to specifically select who they want to represent them in overseeing the police. The importance of having a police oversight commission that is fundamentally community-driven cannot be understated. City Inspector General Joseph Ferguson recently noted that if Chicago police reform efforts “don’t have the community piece in place,” reform “is not going to be seen with the requisite legitimacy.” Still, GAPA’s selection process has merit. While Chicago residents would only directly participate in the process at the very beginning, with the election of District Council members, residents still have influence throughout the process. GAPA’s selection process allows “any resident of the city of Chicago” to nominate a candidate for the Commission, and the City Council (made up of publicly-elected Aldermen) have final say on who is allowed on the Commission. Thus, GAPA gives Chicago residents power in deciding who oversees the police, though admittedly not as much power as CPAC’s direct election process likely would.

Mayoral Power

The differences in selection processes hint at another major difference between CPAC and GAPA: the role of the Mayor. In allowing the Mayor to continually reject nominated candidates for GAPA’s Commission, there is the possibility that a Mayor could indirectly force the Commission Nominating Committee to choose the candidate(s) the Mayor has in mind by rejecting all others, bypassing any power Chicago residents are supposed to have in the selection process. GAPA’s aforementioned provisions do require transparency in terms of requiring the Mayor to explain publicly why they rejected a candidate, and allow the City Council final say in confirmation of candidates to serve as checks on the Mayor’s power, but it is unclear – due to Chicago’s history – how effective these checks will be.

  • The GAPA proposal does not isolate the Mayor’s power in the police oversight process to the selection of commissioners. The Mayor retains a similar ability to either select or reject nominated candidates in the appointment of both a COPA Administrator and Police Superintendent. The Mayor’s power in the appointment of a Superintendent is particularly striking, because unlike the appointment of commissioners or the COPA Administrator, the Mayor is explicitly able to nominate candidates. GAPA checks the Mayor’s power in the appointment of a Superintendent by stating “the Mayor may only nominate a candidate after all candidates from the list that is under consideration have answered questions and presented their credentials and strategic plan for the Superintendent position at four public hearings.” While this will certainly delay the Mayor’s ability to nominate a candidate for Police Superintendent, it is unclear whether that delay would be an effective check on the Mayor’s power in the Superintendent selection process.
  • The CPAC ordinance, on the other hand, excludes the Mayor from all relevant selection processes for Chicago Police Department (CPD) oversight positions. CPAC retains all power in the appointment of a COPA Administrator and Police Superintendent, although it does indicate the intention to work with “an independent search firm” to identify qualified candidates for the COPA Administrator.

Supporters of the GAPA proposal posit that there is no issue with the Mayor having sole power in these selection processes. As the Chicago Council of Lawyers, for example, argues: “the Mayor is usually held politically responsible for the performance of CPD and the Superintendent…it is important for the Mayor to remain involved in the process of hiring the Superintendent.” Still, CPAC has its reasons for distancing Chicago Mayors from these selection processes. Throughout Chicago’s history, the police oversight systems intended to investigate police misconduct have shown a consistent pro-police bias. As noted in our police reform history piece, past Chicago police oversight systems have been stifled by Administrators and Superintendents appointed by Mayors: ignoring the recommendations of its investigators; firing investigators for finding police misconduct in use-of-force incidents; and being hesitant to give strict disciplinary sentences – even when its investigators find severe police misconduct. Considering Chicago’s long history of systemic police bias at the head of its oversight systems, the premise behind CPAC’s processes appear justified in wanting the Mayor removed, as much as possible, from these selection processes.

Discipline of Police Officers

Civilian Office of Police Accountability

Both proposals allow their commissions to set and approve of policy for the Civilian Office of Police Accountability, but the CPAC and GAPA proposals differ in the treatment of COPA in other ways.

  • CPAC takes a direct approach by actively involving itself in COPA’s investigations. CPAC is determined to “supervis[e] the Chief Administrator of COPA” and has power in “directing that the Chief Administrator Investigator conduct investigations into police misconduct.”
  • GAPA takes a more hands-off approach, as it ensures that it will “not review, seek information about or in any way interfere with ongoing COPA investigations.” Some have found GAPA’s treatment of COPA more appealing because it allows COPA a greater amount of independence over its own internal policies.
Police Board 

The proposals for a civilian-led police commission, the Civilian Police Accountability Council (CPAC) and Grassroots Alliance for Police Accountability (GAPA), specifically suggest changes that affect the appointment and duties of the Police Board.

The Chicago Police Board, established by Sections 2-84-020 and 2-84-030 of the Chicago Municipal Code, is an independent civilian-led body composed of nine members. The Mayor has the power to appoint Police Board members with the recommendations of City Council, along with the power to remove members. Among its responsibilities, the Police Board creates the Rules and Regulations of the Chicago Police Department and is largely tasked with deciding “disciplinary matters involving allegations of serious misconduct made against members of the Chicago Police Department” (if COPA or the Police Department’s Bureau of Internal Affairs (BIA) determine that misconduct occurred and the Superintendent of Police decides to file charges to discharge or suspend a police officer for more than thirty days). With these duties, the Police Board wields a large amount of power over the discipline of police officers in cases of misconduct and sets precedents for how misconduct is dealt with internally. Despite this power, misconduct often goes unaddressed because it is rarely reported and investigated; concerns have been raised that the Police Board has been willfully negligent and slow-acting in cases of police misconduct, since officers are rarely disciplined or fired in cases of misconduct.

  • CPAC transfers all responsibility for the hiring and firing of Police Board members from the Mayor to the Commission. CPAC also puts the Commission in charge of Police Board policies and in charge of appointing the Police Superintendent.
  • Conversely, GAPA mandates that the Commission provide a list of three nominees to the Mayor for a replacement in the case of a vacancy, but allows the Mayor to ultimately decide the appointments and dismissals of the Superintendent and Police Board members. 

GAPA and CPAC also approach Police Board policies differently. Unlike CPAC, GAPA leaves policy decisions up to the Board and does not provide substantial civilian oversight of the Police Board. As history has shown, the Mayor’s oversight is not enough to ensure the effectiveness and efficiency of the Chicago Police Board, so given the Police Board’s history, it seems as though the oversight and transfer of some Board powers to a commission under the CPAC would be a step in the right direction. However, this begs the question: why do we need a civilian-led commission to provide oversight of a civilian-led Police Board? This could be seen as further complicating an already complex and underwhelming accountability mechanism.

CPD Policies and Administration

The mayoral appointment of the Police Superintendent and implementation of the policies of the CPD are other points of contention between GAPA and CPAC.

  • While both proposals give power to their respective commissions to establish policy for the CPD, GAPA emphasizes working with the CPD “in order to try to reach consensus about proposed policies,” while CPAC does not appear to share this collaborative sentiment, stating that the Commission can “adopt the rules and regulations” for the governance of CPD. GAPA and CPAC both have immense power in determining CPD policy; despite encouraging cooperation, GAPA’s Commission does have the final say in what CPD policy will be if a disagreement occurs.

Proponents of GAPA support the CPD having a large part in the establishment of its own policies, due to “the complexities of law enforcement in a large city” and point out that heavy-CPD involvement in the drafting policies is “more likely to improve buy-in and more adherence to such policies by the officers that must carry them out.” Some fear, however, that GAPA’s emphasis on “consensus” could lead its Commission to compromise with the CPD and forgo necessary reform measures. University of Chicago Law Professor Sharon Fairley notes in her wide-ranging analysis of civilian oversight commissions across the U.S. that the police oversight systems that result from compromise “often lack the full complement of powers necessary to provide sustainably effective oversight or to spur the transformative police reform the community expects.” GAPA’s emphasis on cooperation is admirable, but in light of CPD’s history of resisting reform calls into question whether a cooperative approach will truly lead to effective, transformational change in the Chicago Police Department.

CPD’s continual unwillingness to accept reform hurts Chicago communities every day and contemporary attempts at police reform show the CPD is still largely unwilling to reform its harmful use-of-force policies. This past June, a Community Working Group tasked with revising “all nine of CPD’s Use of Force policies” was announced by both the Mayor and Police Superintendent. Still, when the working group proposed 155 changes to the CPD’s use-of-force policies, CPD refused to implement all but 5. The proposed changes were necessary, as the COPA Administrator stated in November that CPD continues to get recurring use-of-force complaints, including “excessive use of batons,” “excessive verbal abuse,” and “failure to activate or possess body cameras.” Since the CPD continually resists proposed use-of-force policy changes, it is unclear whether GAPA’s compromising approach will be effective. The CPD’s historic unwillingness to accept reform and the continued complaints of unjustified use-of-force can make CPAC’s insistence on having sole power to determine CPD policy seem necessary.

Legal Considerations

Some Aldermen, law enforcement officials, and proponents of GAPA have raised legal concerns about certain aspects of the CPAC ordinance. As a Center for Fair Courts, Chicago Appleseed was compelled to analyze three of the most-commonly discussed concerns: disqualifications of family members, Chicago’s home rule power, and “one person-one vote.”

Disqualification of Family Members

The CPAC ordinance excludes candidates for the Council whom have familial relations to a “law enforcement officer.” Per the CPAC ordinance section 2-83-030, those familial relations include “the spouse, domestic partner, partner to a civil union or any of the following, whether by blood, marriage or adoption; parent, son, daughter, stepson, stepdaughter, brother, sister, aunt, uncle, niece, nephew, grandparent, grandchild, mother-in-law, father-in-law, brother-in-law, sister-in-law, son-in-law, daughter-in-law, stepfather, stepmother, stepbrother, stepsister, half-brother, half-sister, or first cousin.” The question here is whether or not it is legal to preclude family members of law enforcement officers from running for CPAC positions. This set of exclusions is possibly permissible, as the Illinois Election Code does not comment on disqualification beyond death, resignation, legal disability, change of residency, conviction of “an infamous crime” (typically interpreted to mean “felony”), or violation of the official oath, removal from office, refusal to take oath of office, or a competent tribunal declaring the election void.

City of Chicago Home Rule Power

GAPA proponents maintain that an “elected authority such as CPAC would require either a change in state law or a referendum of Chicago voters.” This is because, according to the Illinois Constitution, a home rule unit like Chicago must gain “approval by referendum to adopt, alter or repeal a form of government.” GAPA contends the selection process in its ordinance avoids this process by not holding a direct election, and thus is more likely to pass than the CPAC proposal, as GAPA would only require “a two-thirds [City] [C]ouncil vote and mayoral approval.” The question is if the City of Chicago has the home rule power to create publicly elected positions, such as those in the CPAC ordinance, without providing a public referendum authorizing the creation of such position. Because past Illinois Supreme Court cases have held that prior police oversight systems, such as the Police Board, are not considered a form of government, it is very likely that the City of Chicago does have the home rule power to create publicly elected positions such as those in CPAC.

One Person – One Vote

Some have also questioned whether elected police oversight representatives must be apportioned on the basis of population in order to comply with one person-one vote constitutional limitations. The Supreme Court in Reynolds v. Sims held that apportioning state representation inconsistently with population is unconstitutional; there is no apparent possible justification for weighting representation in this instance in a way contrary to district population.

General Conclusions

Chicago simply cannot afford to delay its civilian police oversight efforts any longer. Chicago “has paid more than a half billion dollars for police misconduct” over the last decade – mainly to the detriment of our lower-income, primarily Black and Latinx communities. Every day Chicago waits to install an effective civilian police oversight commission, more police misconduct occurs, that total increases, and our communities continue to be abused.

The purpose of civilian-led oversight commissions is to make lasting improvements to policing in Chicago. This process should ultimately reduce and better address racism and misconduct; heal communities and increase civilian engagement; and ward against repeating the past injustices that have happened under the Chicago Police Department’s watch. Unfortunately, recent events have made it unclear whether Chicago will get a civilian police oversight commission at all. It has been reported that Mayor Lightfoot is “moving on” from talks with the Grassroots Alliance for Police Accountability and is instead planning to introduce her own plan for police oversight, but no news about the progress of this plan has been reported since.

Some community members and experts are skeptical of the efficacy of community oversight in general, believing that these commissions add yet another layer to an already complex system. “Third” options have been floated around, where the powers of already existing structures are more directly addressed. For example, one suggestion made by Tracy Siska of the Chicago Justice Project was to use the City Council’s power to create laws that restrict police behavior or label certain acts of misconduct as felonious. Siska described all of the current accountability systems as being “like HR,” in deciding whether or not a police officer loses their job; they are not criminal justice processes and that simply has not been enough. This suggestion is for a shift to create laws, not more policies. This means pushing the onus on legislators and not overburdening an already broken system. Other suggestions have been to reevaluate our system in a national context to recreate the successes of other cities like Seattle and Oakland. This could look like flipping the funnel, where the community takes precedence: civilians can both supervise and audit the system. Other advocates believe that the only way to improve the system of police oversight is to abolish what has done so much harm in the past and create a new system altogether.

Regardless of the specifics of the proposal, the system we have now is not working. It is absolutely imperative that Chicago prioritize police accountability by gaining community trust and input in these processes.

The key to better accountability is avoiding the mistakes of the past. As noted in an article entitled “Cycle of Misconduct: How Chicago has Repeatedly Failed to Police its Police,” there have been mechanisms (such as IPRA, COPA, and BIA) put into place for police misconduct to be investigated and for disciplinary recommendations to be made, but those mechanisms have often failed. The Civilian Police Accountability Council and Grassroots Alliance for Police Accountability have both put forth comprehensive plans to address police misconduct in Chicago and to help give communities more agency in enforcing accountability processes, and these plans must be weighed thoroughly by the Chicago City Council.

Chicago Appleseed Center for Fair Courts supports civilian-led efforts, but it has become increasingly clear that the movement for police accountability in Chicago cannot stop there. Without addressing the inherent racism and other complexities of our current system, and evaluating other necessary pathways for anti-racist accountability, these plans will just be a veneer over a rotten tooth.

Contributing Researchers & Authors: Cinque Carson, undergraduate student at the University of Chicago and Chicago Appleseed Intern; Elijah Gelman, recent graduate from Northwestern University and Chicago Appleseed Intern; and Kaitlyn Filip, JD-PhD Student at Northwestern University and Appleseed Network Collaboration for Justice Fellow.